CVE-2024-39508

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/io-wq: Use set_bit() and test_bit() at worker->flags

Utilize set_bit() and test_bit() on worker->flags within io_uring/io-wq to address potential data races.

The structure io_worker->flags may be accessed through various data paths, leading to concurrency issues. When KCSAN is enabled, it reveals data races occurring in io_worker_handle_work and io_wq_activate_free_worker functions.

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in io_worker_handle_work / io_wq_activate_free_worker
 write to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49071 on cpu 28:
 io_worker_handle_work (io_uring/io-wq.c:434 io_uring/io-wq.c:569)
 io_wq_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:?)

 read to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49024 on cpu 5:
 io_wq_activate_free_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:? io_uring/io-wq.c:285)
 io_wq_enqueue (io_uring/io-wq.c:947)
 io_queue_iowq (io_uring/io_uring.c:524)
 io_req_task_submit (io_uring/io_uring.c:1511)
 io_handle_tw_list (io_uring/io_uring.c:1198)

Line numbers against commit 18daea77cca6 (Merge tag for-linus of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm).

These races involve writes and reads to the same memory location by different tasks running on different CPUs. To mitigate this, refactor the code to use atomic operations such as set_bit(), test_bit(), and clear_bit() instead of basic and and or operations. This ensures thread-safe manipulation of worker flags.

Also, move create_index to avoid holes in the structure.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cbb0affb15470a9621267fe0a8568007553a4bf
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a565304927fbd28c9f028c492b5c1714002cbab
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab702c3483db9046bab9f40306f1a28b22dbbdc0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cbb0affb15470a9621267fe0a8568007553a4bf
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a565304927fbd28c9f028c492b5c1714002cbab
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab702c3483db9046bab9f40306f1a28b22dbbdc0