CVE-2024-41010

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry

Pedro Pinto and later independently also Hyunwoo Kim and Wongi Lee reported an issue that the tcx_entry can be released too early leading to a use after free (UAF) when an active old-style ingress or clsact qdisc with a shared tc block is later replaced by another ingress or clsact instance.

Essentially, the sequence to trigger the UAF (one example) can be as follows:

1. A network namespace is created

2. An ingress qdisc is created. This allocates a tcx_entry, and &tcx_entry->miniq is stored in the qdiscs miniqp->p_miniq. At the same time, a tcf block with index 1 is created.

3. chain0 is attached to the tcf block. chain0 must be connected to the block linked to the ingress qdisc to later reach the function tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del() which triggers the UAF.

4. Create and graft a clsact qdisc. This causes the ingress qdisc created in step 1 to be removed, thus freeing the previously linked tcx_entry:

   rtnetlink_rcv_msg() => tc_modify_qdisc() => qdisc_create() => clsact_init() [a] => qdisc_graft() => qdisc_destroy() => __qdisc_destroy() => ingress_destroy() [b] => tcx_entry_free() => kfree_rcu() // tcx_entry freed

5. Finally, the network namespace is closed. This registers the cleanup_net worker, and during the process of releasing the remaining clsact qdisc, it accesses the tcx_entry that was already freed in step 4, causing the UAF to occur:

   cleanup_net() => ops_exit_list() => default_device_exit_batch() => unregister_netdevice_many() => unregister_netdevice_many_notify() => dev_shutdown() => qdisc_put() => clsact_destroy() [c] => tcf_block_put_ext() => tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del() => tcf_chain_head_change_item() => clsact_chain_head_change() => mini_qdisc_pair_swap() // UAF

There are also other variants, the gist is to add an ingress (or clsact) qdisc with a specific shared block, then to replace that qdisc, waiting for the tcx_entry kfree_rcu() to be executed and subsequently accessing the current active qdiscs miniq one way or another.

The correct fix is to turn the miniq_active boolean into a counter. What can be observed, at step 2 above, the counter transitions from 0->1, at step [a] from 1->2 (in order for the miniq object to remain active during the replacement), then in [b] from 2->1 and finally [c] 1->0 with the eventual release. The reference counter in general ranges from [0,2] and it does not need to be atomic since all access to the counter is protected by the rtnl mutex. With this in place, there is no longer a UAF happening and the tcx_entry is freed at the correct time.

Weakness

Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code.

Affected Software

Extended Description

The use of previously-freed memory can have any number of adverse consequences, ranging from the corruption of valid data to the execution of arbitrary code, depending on the instantiation and timing of the flaw. The simplest way data corruption may occur involves the system’s reuse of the freed memory. Use-after-free errors have two common and sometimes overlapping causes:

In this scenario, the memory in question is allocated to another pointer validly at some point after it has been freed. The original pointer to the freed memory is used again and points to somewhere within the new allocation. As the data is changed, it corrupts the validly used memory; this induces undefined behavior in the process. If the newly allocated data happens to hold a class, in C++ for example, various function pointers may be scattered within the heap data. If one of these function pointers is overwritten with an address to valid shellcode, execution of arbitrary code can be achieved.

Potential Mitigations

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cb6f0bae50441f4b4b32a28315853b279c7404e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/230bb13650b0f186f540500fd5f5f7096a822a2a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f61ecf1bd5b562ebfd7d430ccb31619857e80857
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cb6f0bae50441f4b4b32a28315853b279c7404e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/230bb13650b0f186f540500fd5f5f7096a822a2a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f61ecf1bd5b562ebfd7d430ccb31619857e80857