In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Have format file honor EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED

When eventfs was introduced, special care had to be done to coordinate the freeing of the file meta data with the files that are exposed to user space. The file meta data would have a ref count that is set when the file is created and would be decremented and freed after the last user that opened the file closed it. When the file meta data was to be freed, it would set a flag (EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED) to denote that the file is freed, and any new references made (like new opens or reads) would fail as it is marked freed. This allowed other meta data to be freed after this flag was set (under the event_mutex).

All the files that were dynamically created in the events directory had a pointer to the file meta data and would call event_release() when the last reference to the user space file was closed. This would be the time that it is safe to free the file meta data.

A shortcut was made for the format file. Its i_private would point to the call entry directly and not point to the files meta data. This is because all format files are the same for the same call, so it was thought there was no reason to differentiate them. The other files maintain state (like the enable, trigger, etc). But this meant if the file were to disappear, the format file would be unaware of it.

This caused a race that could be trigger via the user_events test (that would create dynamic events and free them), and running a loop that would read the user_events format files:

In one console run:

cd tools/testing/selftests/user_events

while true; do ./ftrace_test; done

And in another console run:

cd /sys/kernel/tracing/

while true; do cat events/user_events/__test_event/format; done 2>/dev/null

With KASAN memory checking, it would trigger a use-after-free bug report (which was a real bug). This was because the format file was not checking the files meta data flag EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED, so it would access the event that the file meta data pointed to after the event was freed.

After inspection, there are other locations that were found to not check the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag when accessing the trace_event_file. Add a new helper function: event_file_file() that will make sure that the event_mutex is held, and will return NULL if the trace_event_file has the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag set. Have the first reference of the struct file pointer use event_file_file() and check for NULL. Later uses can still use the event_file_data() helper function if the event_mutex is still held and was not released since the event_file_file() call.

Weakness

The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory “belongs” to the code that operates on the new pointer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ed03758ddf0b19d69eed69386d65a92d0091e0c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/531dc6780d94245af037c25c2371c8caf652f0f9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1560408692cd0ab0370cfbe9deb03ce97ab3f6d