In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via the Direct Web Remoting API (UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr) calls. While this is information that would and should be available to admins who possess Sign In As powers, admins who otherwise lack this privilege would still be able to utilize the session IDs to imitate other users.
While this is a very small attack vector that requires very high permissions to execute, its danger lies principally in obfuscating attribution; all Sign In As operations are attributed appropriately in the log files, and a malicious administrator could use this information to render their dealings untraceable — including those admins who have not been granted this ability — such as by using a session ID to generate an API token.
Fixed in: 24.07.12 / 23.01.20 LTS / 23.10.24v13 LTS / 24.04.24v5 LTS
This was the original found by researcher Zakaria Agharghar.
- Later, on October 20, 2025, another researcher (Chris O’Neill) found additional affected DWR Endpoints that are vulnerable to Information Disclosure, namely and in addition to the original found of UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr - Session ID exposure:
UserAjax.getUsersList.dwr - Enumerate all users with IDs, names, emails
RoleAjax.getUserRole.dwr - Get user role information
RoleAjax.getRole.dwr - Get role details
RoleAjax.getRolePermissions.dwr - View role permissions
RoleAjax.isPermissionableInheriting.dwr - Check permission inheritance
RoleAjax.getCurrentCascadePermissionsJobs.dwr - View permission cascade jobs
ThreadMonitorTool.getThreads.dwr - Monitor system threads; and,
CRITICAL - Privilege Escalation: RoleAjax.saveRolePermission.dwr - Modify role permissions
Overall CVSS for the above findings:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Score: 9.1 (Critical)
Weakness
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
Potential Mitigations
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.