CVE-2024-47678

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

icmp: change the order of rate limits

ICMP messages are ratelimited :

After the blamed commits, the two rate limiters are applied in this order:

1. host wide ratelimit (icmp_global_allow())

2. Per destination ratelimit (inetpeer based)

In order to avoid side-channels attacks, we need to apply the per destination check first.

This patch makes the following change :

1. icmp_global_allow() checks if the host wide limit is reached. But credits are not yet consumed. This is deferred to 3)

2. The per destination limit is checked/updated. This might add a new node in inetpeer tree.

3. icmp_global_consume() consumes tokens if prior operations succeeded.

This means that host wide ratelimit is still effective in keeping inetpeer tree small even under DDOS.

As a bonus, I removed icmp_global.lock as the fast path can use a lock-free operation.

Weakness

The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
• Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
• Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
• If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
• Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/483397b4ba280813e4a9c161a0a85172ddb43d19
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/662ec52260cc07b9ae53ecd3925183c29d34288b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c2bd38b95f75f3d2a08c93e35303e26d480d24e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/997ba8889611891f91e8ad83583466aeab6239a3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7722921adb046e3836eb84372241f32584bdb07
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html