Gradio is an open-source Python package designed for quick prototyping. This vulnerability involves a race condition in the update_root_in_config function, allowing an attacker to modify the root URL used by the Gradio frontend to communicate with the backend. By exploiting this flaw, an attacker can redirect user traffic to a malicious server. This could lead to the interception of sensitive data such as authentication credentials or uploaded files. This impacts all users who connect to a Gradio server, especially those exposed to the internet, where malicious actors could exploit this race condition. Users are advised to upgrade to gradio>=5 to address this issue. There are no known workarounds for this issue.
The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gradio | Gradio_project | * | 5.0.0 (excluding) |
This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider. A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single “x++” statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x). The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.