CodeChecker is an analyzer tooling, defect database and viewer extension for the Clang Static Analyzer and Clang Tidy.
Cross-site request forgery allows an unauthenticated attacker to hijack the authentication of a logged in user, and use the web API with the same permissions, including but not limited to adding, removing or editing products. The attacker needs to know the ID of the available products to modify or delete them. The attacker cannot directly exfiltrate data (view) from CodeChecker, due to being limited to form-based CSRF.
This issue affects CodeChecker: through 6.24.4.
Weakness
The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request.
Potential Mitigations
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
References