ibm.ibm_zhmc is an Ansible collection for the IBM Z HMC. The Ansible collection ibm.ibm_zhmc writes password-like properties in clear text into its log file and into the output returned by some of its Ansible module in the following cases: 1. The boot_ftp_password and ssc_master_pw properties are passed as input to the zhmc_partition Ansible module. 2. The ssc_master_pw and zaware_master_pw properties are passed as input to the zhmc_lpar Ansible module. 3. The password property is passed as input to the zhmc_user Ansible module (just in log file, not in module output). 4. The bind_password property is passed as input to the zhmc_ldap_server_definition Ansible module. These properties appear in the module output only when they were specified in the module input and when creating or updating the corresponding resources. They do not appear in the output when retrieving facts for the corresponding resources. These properties appear in the log file only when the log_file module input parameter is used. By default, no log file is created. This issue has been fixed in ibm.ibm_zhmc version 1.9.3. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere.
Because the information is stored in cleartext (i.e., unencrypted), attackers could potentially read it. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information. When organizations adopt cloud services, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet. In some systems/environments such as cloud, the use of “double encryption” (at both the software and hardware layer) might be required, and the developer might be solely responsible for both layers, instead of shared responsibility with the administrator of the broader system/environment.