OpenVPN before 2.6.11 does not santize PUSH_REPLY messages properly which an attacker controlling the server can use to inject unexpected arbitrary data ending up in client logs.
The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Openvpn | Openvpn | 2.6.0 (including) | 2.6.11 (excluding) |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | devel | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | esm-infra-legacy/trusty | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | esm-infra/bionic | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | esm-infra/xenial | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | focal | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | jammy | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | mantic | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | noble | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | oracular | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | trusty/esm | * |
Openvpn | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
When input does not comply with the expected type, attackers could trigger unexpected errors, cause incorrect actions to take place, or exploit latent vulnerabilities that would not be possible if the input conformed with the expected type. This weakness can appear in type-unsafe programming languages, or in programming languages that support casting or conversion of an input to another type.