CVE-2024-56568

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/arm-smmu: Defer probe of clients after smmu device bound

Null pointer dereference occurs due to a race between smmu driver probe and client driver probe, when of_dma_configure() for client is called after the iommu_device_register() for smmu driver probe has executed but before the driver_bound() for smmu driver has been called.

Following is how the race occurs:

T1:Smmu device probe T2: Client device probe

really_probe() arm_smmu_device_probe() iommu_device_register() really_probe() platform_dma_configure() of_dma_configure() of_dma_configure_id() of_iommu_configure() iommu_probe_device() iommu_init_device() arm_smmu_probe_device() arm_smmu_get_by_fwnode() driver_find_device_by_fwnode() driver_find_device() next_device() klist_next() /* null ptr assigned to smmu / / null ptr dereference while smmu->streamid_mask */ driver_bound() klist_add_tail()

When this null smmu pointer is dereferenced later in arm_smmu_probe_device, the device crashes.

Fix this by deferring the probe of the client device until the smmu device has bound to the arm smmu driver.

[will: Add comment]

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/229e6ee43d2a160a1592b83aad620d6027084aad
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a9485918a042e3114890dfbe19839a1897f8b2c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5018696b19bc6c021e934a8a59f4b1dd8c0ac9f8
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2527d07c7e9cda2c6165d5edccf74752baac1b0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc02407ea952e20c544a078a6be2e6f008327973
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8f794f387ad21c4696e5cd0626cb6f8a5f6aea5
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00001.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00002.html