A ZigBee coordinator, router, or end device may change their node ID when an unsolicited encrypted rejoin response is received, this change in node ID causes Denial of Service (DoS). To recover from this DoS, the network must be re-established
Weakness
The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.
Potential Mitigations
- Use a mechanism that can validate the identity of the source, such as a certificate, and validate the integrity of data to ensure that it cannot be modified in transit using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack.
- When designing functionality of actions in the URL scheme, consider whether the action should be accessible to all mobile applications, or if an allowlist of applications to interface with is appropriate.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/500.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/594.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/595.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/596.html