A flaw was found in runtimes-inventory-rhel8-operator. An internal proxy component is incorrectly configured. Because of this flaw, the proxy attaches the clusters main administrative credentials to any command it receives, instead of only the specific reports it is supposed to handle.
This allows a standard user within the cluster to send unauthorized commands to the management platform, effectively acting with the full permissions of the cluster administrator. This could lead to unauthorized changes to the clusters configuration or status on the Red Hat platform.
The product receives a request, message, or directive from an upstream component, but the product does not sufficiently preserve the original source of the request before forwarding the request to an external actor that is outside of the product’s control sphere. This causes the product to appear to be the source of the request, leading it to act as a proxy or other intermediary between the upstream component and the external actor.
If an attacker cannot directly contact a target, but the product has access to the target, then the attacker can send a request to the product and have it be forwarded to the target. The request would appear to be coming from the product’s system, not the attacker’s system. As a result, the attacker can bypass access controls (such as firewalls) or hide the source of malicious requests, since the requests would not be coming directly from the attacker. Since proxy functionality and message-forwarding often serve a legitimate purpose, this issue only becomes a vulnerability when: