MacOS version of Inkscape bundles a Python interpreter that inherits the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) permissions granted by the user to the main application bundle. An attacker with local user access can invoke this interpreter with arbitrary commands or scripts, leveraging the applications previously granted TCC permissions to access users files in privacy-protected folders without triggering user prompts. Accessing other resources beyond previously granted TCC permissions will prompt the user for approval in the name of Inkscape, potentially disguising attackers malicious intent.
This issue has been fixed in 1.4.3 version of Inkscape.
Weakness
During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/81.html