CVE-2025-21919

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sched/fair: Fix potential memory corruption in child_cfs_rq_on_list

child_cfs_rq_on_list attempts to convert a prev pointer to a cfs_rq. This prev pointer can originate from struct rqs leaf_cfs_rq_list, making the conversion invalid and potentially leading to memory corruption. Depending on the relative positions of leaf_cfs_rq_list and the task group (tg) pointer within the struct, this can cause a memory fault or access garbage data.

The issue arises in list_add_leaf_cfs_rq, where both cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list and rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list are added to the same leaf list. Also, rq->tmp_alone_branch can be set to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.

This adds a check if (prev == &rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list) after the main conditional in child_cfs_rq_on_list. This ensures that the container_of operation will convert a correct cfs_rq struct.

This check is sufficient because only cfs_rqs on the same CPU are added to the list, so verifying the prev pointer against the current rqs list head is enough.

Fixes a potential memory corruption issue that due to current struct layout might not be manifesting as a crash but could lead to unpredictable behavior when the layout changes.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/000c9ee43928f2ce68a156dd40bab7616256f4dd
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b4035ddbfc8e4521f85569998a7569668cccf51
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5cb300dcdd27e6a351ac02541e0231261c775852
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cc7f0018609f75a349e42e3aebc3b0e905ba775
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5741e4b9ef3567613b2351384f91d3f16e59986
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1dd09df30ba86716cb2ffab97dc35195c01eb8f