CVE-2025-22036

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

exfat: fix random stack corruption after get_block

When get_block is called with a buffer_head allocated on the stack, such as do_mpage_readpage, stack corruption due to buffer_head UAF may occur in the following race condition situation.

 <CPU 0>                      <CPU 1>

mpage_read_folio «bh on stack» do_mpage_readpage exfat_get_block bh_read __bh_read get_bh(bh) submit_bh wait_on_buffer … end_buffer_read_sync __end_buffer_read_notouch unlock_buffer «keep going» … … … … «bh is not valid out of mpage_read_folio» . . another_function «variable A on stack» put_bh(bh) atomic_dec(bh->b_count)

• stack corruption here *

This patch returns -EAGAIN if a folio does not have buffers when bh_read needs to be called. By doing this, the caller can fallback to functions like block_read_full_folio(), create a buffer_head in the folio, and then call get_block again.

Lets do not call bh_read() with on-stack buffer_head.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bb7ff4204b6d4927e982cd256286c09ed4fd8ca
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49b0a6ab8e528a0c1c50e37cef9b9c7c121365f2
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7447286363dc1e410bf30b87d75168f3519f9cc
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f807a6bf2005740fa26b4f59c4a003dc966b9afd