In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

udp: Fix multiple wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.

__udp_enqueue_schedule_skb() has the following condition:

if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk->sk_rcvbuf) goto drop;

sk->sk_rcvbuf is initialised by net.core.rmem_default and later can be configured by SO_RCVBUF, which is limited by net.core.rmem_max, or SO_RCVBUFFORCE.

If we set INT_MAX to sk->sk_rcvbuf, the condition is always false as sk->sk_rmem_alloc is also signed int.

Then, the size of the incoming skb is added to sk->sk_rmem_alloc unconditionally.

This results in integer overflow (possibly multiple times) on sk->sk_rmem_alloc and allows a single socket to have skb up to net.core.udp_mem[1].

For example, if we set a large value to udp_mem[1] and INT_MAX to sk->sk_rcvbuf and flood packets to the socket, we can see multiple overflows:

cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:

UDP: inuse 3 mem 7956736 <– (7956736 « 12) bytes > INT_MAX * 15 ^- PAGE_SHIFT

ss -uam

State Recv-Q … UNCONN -1757018048 … <– flipping the sign repeatedly skmem:(r2537949248,rb2147483646,t0,tb212992,f1984,w0,o0,bl0,d0)

Previously, we had a boundary check for INT_MAX, which was removed by commit 6a1f12dd85a8 (udp: relax atomic operation on sk->sk_rmem_alloc).

A complete fix would be to revert it and cap the right operand by INT_MAX:

rmem = atomic_add_return(size, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc); if (rmem > min(size + (unsigned int)sk->sk_rcvbuf, INT_MAX)) goto uncharge_drop;

but we do not want to add the expensive atomic_add_return() back just for the corner case.

Casting rmem to unsigned int prevents multiple wraparounds, but we still allow a single wraparound.

cat /proc/net/sockstat | grep UDP:

UDP: inuse 3 mem 524288 <– (INT_MAX + 1) » 12

ss -uam

State Recv-Q … UNCONN -2147482816 … <– INT_MAX + 831 bytes skmem:(r2147484480,rb2147483646,t0,tb212992,f3264,w0,o0,bl0,d14468947)

So, lets define rmem and rcvbuf as unsigned int and check skb->truesize only when rcvbuf is large enough to lower the overflow possibility.

Note that we still have a small chance to see overflow if multiple skbs to the same socket are processed on different core at the same time and each size does not exceed the limit but the total size does.

Note also that we must ignore skb->truesize for a small buffer as explained in commit 363dc73acacb (udp: be less conservative with sock rmem accounting).

Weakness

The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound, when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This can introduce other weaknesses when the calculation is used for resource management or execution control.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
• If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
• Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences.
• Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
• Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.
• Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
• Understand the programming language’s underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, “not-a-number” calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]
• Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/92.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f529988efe9870db802cb79d01d8f473099b4d7
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a465a0da13ee9fbd7d3cd0b2893309b0fe4b7e3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7571aadd20289e9ea10ebfed0986f39ed8b3c16b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94d5ad7b41122be33ebc2a6830fe710cba1ecd75