Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. Starting in version 4.4.0 and prior to version 4.9.1, an unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows for remote code execution on Wazuh servers. DistributedAPI parameters are a serialized as JSON and deserialized using as_wazuh_object
(in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py
). If an attacker manages to inject an unsanitized dictionary in DAPI request/response, they can forge an unhandled exception (__unhandled_exc__
) to evaluate arbitrary python code. The vulnerability can be triggered by anybody with API access (compromised dashboard or Wazuh servers in the cluster) or, in certain configurations, even by a compromised agent. Version 4.9.1 contains a fix.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.