Concorde, formerly know as Nexkey, is a fork of the federated microblogging platform Misskey. Due to a lack of CSRF countermeasures and improper settings of cookies for MediaProxy authentication, there is a vulnerability that allows MediaProxy authentication to be bypassed. In versions prior to 12.25Q1.1, the authentication cookie does not have the SameSite attribute. This allows an attacker to bypass MediaProxy authentication and load any image without restrictions under certain circumstances. In versions prior to 12.24Q2.3, this cookie was also used to authenticate the job queue management page (bull-board), so bull-board authentication is also bypassed. This may enable attacks that have a significant impact on availability and integrity.
The affected versions are too old to be covered by this advisory, but the maintainers of Concorde strongly recommend not using older versions. Version 12.25Q1.1 contains a patch. There is no effective workaround other than updating.
Weakness
The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request.
Potential Mitigations
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
References