Manifest offers users a one-file micro back end. Prior to version 4.9.1, Manifest employs a weak password hashing implementation that uses SHA3 without a salt. This exposes user passwords to a higher risk of being cracked if an attacker gains access to the database. Without the use of a salt, identical passwords across multiple users will result in the same hash, making it easier for attackers to identify and exploit patterns, thereby accelerating the cracking process. Version 4.9.1 fixes the issue.
The product uses a one-way cryptographic hash against an input that should not be reversible, such as a password, but the product does not also use a salt as part of the input.
This makes it easier for attackers to pre-compute the hash value using dictionary attack techniques such as rainbow tables. It should be noted that, despite common perceptions, the use of a good salt with a hash does not sufficiently increase the effort for an attacker who is targeting an individual password, or who has a large amount of computing resources available, such as with cloud-based services or specialized, inexpensive hardware. Offline password cracking can still be effective if the hash function is not expensive to compute; many cryptographic functions are designed to be efficient and can be vulnerable to attacks using massive computing resources, even if the hash is cryptographically strong. The use of a salt only slightly increases the computing requirements for an attacker compared to other strategies such as adaptive hash functions. See CWE-916 for more details.