Rack provides an interface for developing web applications in Ruby. Prior to versions 2.2.13, 3.0.14, and 3.1.12, Rack::Static can serve files under the specified root: even if urls: are provided, which may expose other files under the specified root: unexpectedly. The vulnerability occurs because Rack::Static does not properly sanitize user-supplied paths before serving files. Specifically, encoded path traversal sequences are not correctly validated, allowing attackers to access files outside the designated static file directory. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can gain access to all files under the specified root: directory, provided they are able to determine then path of the file. Versions 2.2.13, 3.0.14, and 3.1.12 contain a patch for the issue. Other mitigations include removing usage of Rack::Static, or ensuring that root: points at a directory path which only contains files which should be accessed publicly. It is likely that a CDN or similar static file server would also mitigate the issue.
Weakness
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize sequences such as “..” that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.
Affected Software
| Name |
Vendor |
Start Version |
End Version |
| Ruby-rack |
Ubuntu |
esm-apps/bionic |
* |
| Ruby-rack |
Ubuntu |
esm-apps/focal |
* |
| Ruby-rack |
Ubuntu |
esm-apps/jammy |
* |
| Ruby-rack |
Ubuntu |
esm-apps/xenial |
* |
| Ruby-rack |
Ubuntu |
esm-infra-legacy/trusty |
* |
| Ruby-rack |
Ubuntu |
noble |
* |
| Ruby-rack |
Ubuntu |
oracular |
* |
| Ruby-rack |
Ubuntu |
upstream |
* |
Potential Mitigations
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single “.” character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as “/” to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering “/” is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of “" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if “../” sequences are removed from the “…/…//” string in a sequential fashion, two instances of “../” would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the “../” string.
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application’s current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes “..” sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
References