CryptoLib provides a software-only solution using the CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol - Extended Procedures (SDLS-EP) to secure communications between a spacecraft running the core Flight System (cFS) and a ground station. A critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability was identified in the Crypto_AOS_ProcessSecurity function of CryptoLib versions 1.3.3 and prior. This vulnerability allows an attacker to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) or potentially execute arbitrary code (RCE) by providing a maliciously crafted AOS frame with an insufficient length. The vulnerability lies in the function Crypto_AOS_ProcessSecurity, specifically during the processing of the Frame Error Control Field (FECF). The affected code attempts to read from the p_ingest buffer at indices current_managed_parameters_struct.max_frame_size - 2 and current_managed_parameters_struct.max_frame_size - 1 without verifying if len_ingest is sufficiently large. This leads to a heap buffer overflow when len_ingest is smaller than max_frame_size. As of time of publication, no known patched versions exist.
Weakness
A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().
Affected Software
| Name |
Vendor |
Start Version |
End Version |
| Cryptolib |
Nasa |
* |
* |
Potential Mitigations
- Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
- D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
- Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
References