CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2025-31929

Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware

Published: May 13, 2025 | Modified: May 13, 2025
CVSS 3.x
N/A
Source:
NVD
CVSS 2.x
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
Ubuntu

A vulnerability has been identified in IEC 1Ph 7.4kW Child socket (8EM1310-2EH04-0GA0) (All versions), IEC 1Ph 7.4kW Child socket/ shutter (8EM1310-2EN04-0GA0) (All versions), IEC 1Ph 7.4kW Parent cable 7m (8EM1310-2EJ04-3GA1) (All versions), IEC 1Ph 7.4kW Parent cable 7m incl. SIM (8EM1310-2EJ04-3GA2) (All versions), IEC 1Ph 7.4kW Parent socket (8EM1310-2EH04-3GA1) (All versions), IEC 1Ph 7.4kW Parent socket incl. SIM (8EM1310-2EH04-3GA2) (All versions), IEC 1Ph 7.4kW Parent socket/ shutter (8EM1310-2EN04-3GA1) (All versions), IEC 1Ph 7.4kW Parent socket/ shutter SIM (8EM1310-2EN04-3GA2) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Child cable 7m (8EM1310-3EJ04-0GA0) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Child socket (8EM1310-3EH04-0GA0) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Child socket/ shutter (8EM1310-3EN04-0GA0) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Parent cable 7m (8EM1310-3EJ04-3GA1) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Parent cable 7m incl. SIM (8EM1310-3EJ04-3GA2) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Parent socket (8EM1310-3EH04-3GA1) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Parent socket incl. SIM (8EM1310-3EH04-3GA2) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Parent socket/ shutter (8EM1310-3EN04-3GA1) (All versions), IEC 3Ph 22kW Parent socket/ shutter SIM (8EM1310-3EN04-3GA2) (All versions), IEC ERK 3Ph 22 kW Child cable 7m (8EM1310-3FJ04-0GA0) (All versions), IEC ERK 3Ph 22 kW Child cable 7m (8EM1310-3FJ04-0GA1) (All versions), IEC ERK 3Ph 22 kW Child cable 7m (8EM1310-3FJ04-0GA2) (All versions), IEC ERK 3Ph 22 kW Child socket (8EM1310-3FH04-0GA0) (All versions), IEC ERK 3Ph 22 kW Parent socket (8EM1310-3FH04-3GA1) (All versions), IEC ERK 3Ph 22 kW Parent socket incl. SI (8EM1310-3FH04-3GA2) (All versions), UL Commercial Cellular 48A NTEP (8EM1310-5HF14-1GA2) (All versions), UL Commercial Child 40A w/ 15118 HW (8EM1310-4CF14-0GA0) (All versions), UL Commercial Child 48A BA Compliant (8EM1315-5CG14-0GA0) (All versions), UL Commercial Child 48A w/ 15118 HW (8EM1310-5CF14-0GA0) (All versions), UL Commercial Parent 40A with Simcard (8EM1310-4CF14-1GA2) (All versions), UL Commercial Parent 48A (USPS) (8EM1317-5CG14-1GA2) (All versions), UL Commercial Parent 48A BA Compliant (8EM1315-5CG14-1GA2) (All versions), UL Commercial Parent 48A with Simcard BA (8EM1310-5CF14-1GA2) (All versions), UL Commercial Parent 48A, 15118, 25ft (8EM1310-5CG14-1GA1) (All versions), UL Commercial Parent 48A, 15118, 25ft (8EM1314-5CG14-2FA2) (All versions), UL Commercial Parent 48A, 15118, 25ft (8EM1315-5HG14-1GA2) (All versions), UL Commercial Parent 48A,15118 25ft Sim (8EM1310-5CG14-1GA2) (All versions), UL Resi High End 40A w/15118 Hw (8EM1312-4CF18-0FA3) (All versions), UL Resi High End 48A w/15118 Hw (8EM1312-5CF18-0FA3) (All versions), VersiCharge Blue™ 80A AC Cellular (8EM1315-7BG16-1FH2) (All versions). Affected devices do not contain an Immutable Root of Trust in M0 Hardware. An attacker with physical access to the device could use this to execute arbitrary code.

Weakness

A missing immutable root of trust in the hardware results in the ability to bypass secure boot or execute untrusted or adversarial boot code.

Extended Description

A System-on-Chip (SoC) implements secure boot by verifying or authenticating signed boot code. The signing of the code is achieved by an entity that the SoC trusts. Before executing the boot code, the SoC verifies that the code or the public key with which the code has been signed has not been tampered with. The other data upon which the SoC depends are system-hardware settings in fuses such as whether “Secure Boot is enabled”. These data play a crucial role in establishing a Root of Trust (RoT) to execute secure-boot flows. One of the many ways RoT is achieved is by storing the code and data in memory or fuses. This memory should be immutable, i.e., once the RoT is programmed/provisioned in memory, that memory should be locked and prevented from further programming or writes. If the memory contents (i.e., RoT) are mutable, then an adversary can modify the RoT to execute their choice of code, resulting in a compromised secure boot. Note that, for components like ROM, secure patching/update features should be supported to allow authenticated and authorized updates in the field.

Potential Mitigations

References