A flaw was found in Keycloak. By setting a verification policy to ALL, the trust store certificate verification is skipped, which is unintended.
The product communicates with a host that provides a certificate, but the product does not properly ensure that the certificate is actually associated with that host.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Build of Keycloak | RedHat | keycloak | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.0 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-operator-bundle:26.0.11-2 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.0 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-rhel9:26.0-12 | * |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.0 | RedHat | rhbk/keycloak-rhel9-operator:26.0-13 | * |
Even if a certificate is well-formed, signed, and follows the chain of trust, it may simply be a valid certificate for a different site than the site that the product is interacting with. If the certificate’s host-specific data is not properly checked - such as the Common Name (CN) in the Subject or the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension of an X.509 certificate - it may be possible for a redirection or spoofing attack to allow a malicious host with a valid certificate to provide data, impersonating a trusted host. In order to ensure data integrity, the certificate must be valid and it must pertain to the site that is being accessed. Even if the product attempts to check the hostname, it is still possible to incorrectly check the hostname. For example, attackers could create a certificate with a name that begins with a trusted name followed by a NUL byte, which could cause some string-based comparisons to only examine the portion that contains the trusted name. This weakness can occur even when the product uses Certificate Pinning, if the product does not verify the hostname at the time a certificate is pinned.