CVE-2025-38085

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/hugetlb: fix huge_pmd_unshare() vs GUP-fast race

huge_pmd_unshare() drops a reference on a page table that may have previously been shared across processes, potentially turning it into a normal page table used in another process in which unrelated VMAs can afterwards be installed.

If this happens in the middle of a concurrent gup_fast(), gup_fast() could end up walking the page tables of another process. While I dont see any way in which that immediately leads to kernel memory corruption, it is really weird and unexpected.

Fix it with an explicit broadcast IPI through tlb_remove_table_sync_one(), just like we do in khugepaged when removing page tables for a THP collapse.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/034a52b5ef57c9c8225d94e9067f3390bb33922f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1013af4f585fccc4d3e5c5824d174de2257f7d6d
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952596b08c74e8fe9e2883d1dc8a8f54a37384ec
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3d864c901a300c295692d129159fc3001a56185
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6bfeb97941a9187833b526bc6cc4ff5706d0ce9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7754d3aa7bf9f62218d096c0c8f6c13698fac8b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe684290418ef9ef76630072086ee530b92f02b8
• https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/420715744
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html