CVE-2025-38298

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

EDAC/skx_common: Fix general protection fault

After loading i10nm_edac (which automatically loads skx_edac_common), if unload only i10nm_edac, then reload it and perform error injection testing, a general protection fault may occur:

mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged Oops: general protection fault … … Workqueue: events mce_gen_pool_process RIP: 0010:string+0x53/0xe0 … Call Trace: ? die_addr+0x37/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x1e7/0x3f0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? string+0x53/0xe0 vsnprintf+0x23e/0x4c0 snprintf+0x4d/0x70 skx_adxl_decode+0x16a/0x330 [skx_edac_common] skx_mce_check_error.part.0+0xf8/0x220 [skx_edac_common] skx_mce_check_error+0x17/0x20 [skx_edac_common] …

The issue arose was because the variable adxl_component_count (inside skx_edac_common), which counts the ADXL components, was not reset. During the reloading of i10nm_edac, the count was incremented by the actual number of ADXL components again, resulting in a count that was double the real number of ADXL components. This led to an out-of-bounds reference to the ADXL component array, causing the general protection fault above.

Fix this issue by resetting the adxl_component_count in adxl_put(), which is called during the unloading of {skx,i10nm}_edac.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20d2d476b3ae18041be423671a8637ed5ffd6958
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31ef6f7c9aee3be78d63789653e92350f2537f93
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f5d0659000923735350da60ad710f8c804544fe
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80bf28fd623d97dd4f4825fbbe9d736cec2afba3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a13e8343ffcff27af1ff79597ff7ba241e6d9471
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6ed3a6edff09c1187cc6ade7f5967bca2376a13
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf6a8502a5f4ff6e4d135d795945cdade49ec8b0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8530ed3c0769a4d8f79c212715ec1cf277787f8
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html