CVE-2025-38617

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/packet: fix a race in packet_set_ring() and packet_notifier()

When packet_set_ring() releases po->bind_lock, another thread can run packet_notifier() and process an NETDEV_UP event.

This race and the fix are both similar to that of commit 15fe076edea7 (net/packet: fix a race in packet_bind() and packet_notifier()).

There too the packet_notifier NETDEV_UP event managed to run while a po->bind_lock critical section had to be temporarily released. And the fix was similarly to temporarily set po->num to zero to keep the socket unhooked until the lock is retaken.

The po->bind_lock in packet_set_ring and packet_notifier precede the introduction of git history.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01d3c8417b9c1b884a8a981a3b886da556512f36
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18f13f2a83eb81be349a9757ba2141ff1da9ad73
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7da733f117533e9b2ebbd530a22ae4028713955c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7de07705007c7e34995a5599aaab1d23e762d7ca
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88caf46db8239e6471413d28aabaa6b8bd552805
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba2257034755ae773722f15f4c3ad1dcdad15ca9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e50ccfaca9e3c671cae917dcb994831a859cf588
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1791fd7b845bea0ce9674fcf2febee7bc87a893
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2e8fcfd2b1bc754920108b7f2cd75082c5a18df
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html