CVE-2025-39723

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfs: Fix unbuffered write error handling

If all the subrequests in an unbuffered write stream fail, the subrequest collector doesnt update the stream->transferred value and it retains its initial LONG_MAX value. Unfortunately, if all active streams fail, then we take the smallest value of { LONG_MAX, LONG_MAX, … } as the value to set in wreq->transferred - which is then returned from ->write_iter().

LONG_MAX was chosen as the initial value so that all the streams can be quickly assessed by taking the smallest value of all stream->transferred - but this only works if weve set any of them.

Fix this by adding a flag to indicate whether the value in stream->transferred is valid and checking that when we integrate the values. stream->transferred can then be initialised to zero.

This was found by running the generic/750 xfstest against cifs with cache=none. It splices data to the target file. Once (if) it has used up all the available scratch space, the writes start failing with ENOSPC. This causes ->write_iter() to fail. However, it was returning wreq->transferred, i.e. LONG_MAX, rather than an error (because it thought the amount transferred was non-zero) and iter_file_splice_write() would then try to clean up that amount of pipe bufferage - leading to an oops when it overran. The kernel log showed:

CIFS: VFS: Send error in write = -28

followed by:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008

with:

RIP: 0010:iter_file_splice_write+0x3a4/0x520
do_splice+0x197/0x4e0

or:

RIP: 0010:pipe_buf_release (include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h:282)
iter_file_splice_write (fs/splice.c:755)

Also put a warning check into splice to announce if ->write_iter() returned that it had written more than it was asked to.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/387164a2b97e1f5404c6d0049a7409bac7d2bc5b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3de58b12ce074ec05b8741fa28d62ccb1070468
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f08c80af3c9a9849cd178b4843b7c01d103506a1