CVE-2025-39966

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommufd: Fix race during abort for file descriptors

fput() doesnt actually call file_operations release() synchronously, it puts the file on a work queue and it will be released eventually.

This is normally fine, except for iommufd the file and the iommufd_object are tied to gether. The file has the object as its private_data and holds a users refcount, while the object is expected to remain alive as long as the file is.

When the allocation of a new object aborts before installing the file it will fput() the file and then go on to immediately kfree() the obj. This causes a UAF once the workqueue completes the fput() and tries to decrement the users refcount.

Fix this by putting the core code in charge of the file lifetime, and call __fput_sync() during abort to ensure that release() is called before kfree. __fput_sync() is a bit too tricky to open code in all the object implementations. Instead the objects tell the core code where the file pointer is and the core will take care of the life cycle.

If the object is successfully allocated then the file will hold a users refcount and the iommufd_object cannot be destroyed.

It is worth noting that close(); ioctl(IOMMU_DESTROY); doesnt have an issue because close() is already using a synchronous version of fput().

The UAF looks like this:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iommufd_eventq_fops_release+0x45/0xc0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c:376
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888059c97804 by task syz.0.46/6164

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6164 Comm: syz.0.46 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xcd/0x630 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x100/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:96 [inline]
 atomic_fetch_sub_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:400 [inline]
 __refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:455 [inline]
 refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:476 [inline]
 iommufd_eventq_fops_release+0x45/0xc0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c:376
 __fput+0x402/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:468
 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227
 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xeb/0x110 kernel/entry/common.c:43
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:225 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:175 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:210 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x41c/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17195a7d754a5c6a31888702ca93f6f08f3383ad
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e034bf045b12852a24d5d33f2451850818ba0c1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4825368285e33d6360c6c6a6a10d2d83da06e55