An Origin Validation Error in the elysia-cors library thru 1.3.0 allows attackers to bypass Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) restrictions. The library incorrectly validates the supplied origin by checking if it is a substring of any domain in the sites CORS policy, rather than performing an exact match. For example, a malicious origin like notexample.com, example.common.net is whitelisted when the sites CORS policy specifies example.com. This vulnerability enables unauthorized access to user data on sites using the elysia-cors library for CORS validation.
Weakness
The product does not properly account for differences in case sensitivity when accessing or determining the properties of a resource, leading to inconsistent results.
Extended Description
Improperly handled case sensitive data can lead to several possible consequences, including:
Potential Mitigations
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
References