DSpace open source software is a repository application which provides durable access to digital resources. Two related XML External Entity (XXE) injection possibilities impact all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in Simple Archive Format), either from command-line (./dspace import command) or from the Batch Import (Zip) user interface feature. External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in import from external sources via the user interface or REST API. An XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attackers site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running. The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer / Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators (from user interface / REST API) or system administrators (from command-line). Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator, who would trigger the import. The fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions. For those who cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch the DSpace backend. One may also apply some best practices, though the protection provided is not as complete as upgrading. Administrators must carefully inspect any SAF archives (they did not construct themselves) before importing. As necessary, affected external services can be disabled to mitigate the ability for payloads to be delivered via external service APIs.
The product processes an XML document that can contain XML entities with URIs that resolve to documents outside of the intended sphere of control, causing the product to embed incorrect documents into its output.
XML documents optionally contain a Document Type Definition (DTD), which, among other features, enables the definition of XML entities. It is possible to define an entity by providing a substitution string in the form of a URI. The XML parser can access the contents of this URI and embed these contents back into the XML document for further processing. By submitting an XML file that defines an external entity with a file:// URI, an attacker can cause the processing application to read the contents of a local file. For example, a URI such as “file:///c:/winnt/win.ini” designates (in Windows) the file C:\Winnt\win.ini, or file:///etc/passwd designates the password file in Unix-based systems. Using URIs with other schemes such as http://, the attacker can force the application to make outgoing requests to servers that the attacker cannot reach directly, which can be used to bypass firewall restrictions or hide the source of attacks such as port scanning. Once the content of the URI is read, it is fed back into the application that is processing the XML. This application may echo back the data (e.g. in an error message), thereby exposing the file contents.