The configuration of Nozbe on macOS, specifically the RunAsNode fuse enabled, allows a local attacker with unprivileged access to execute arbitrary code that inherits Nozbe TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) permissions.
Acquired resource access is limited to previously granted permissions by the user. Access to other resources beyond granted-permissions requires user interaction with a system prompt asking for permission.
This issue was fixed in version 2025.11 of Nozbe.
Weakness
During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
References