ImageMagick is free and open-source software used for editing and manipulating digital images. ImageMagick versions lower than 14.8.2 include insecure functions: SeekBlob(), which permits advancing the stream offset beyond the current end without increasing capacity, and WriteBlob(), which then expands by quantum + length (amortized) instead of offset + length, and copies to data + offset. When offset ≫ extent, the copy targets memory beyond the allocation, producing a deterministic heap write on 64-bit builds. No 2⁶⁴ arithmetic wrap, external delegates, or policy settings are required. This is fixed in version 14.8.2.
Weakness
A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|
| Imagemagick | Imagemagick | * | 6.9.13-29 (excluding) |
| Imagemagick | Imagemagick | 7.0.0-0 (including) | 7.1.2-3 (excluding) |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | esm-apps/focal | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | esm-apps/jammy | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | esm-apps/noble | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | esm-infra-legacy/trusty | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | esm-infra/bionic | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | esm-infra/xenial | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | jammy | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | noble | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | plucky | * |
| Imagemagick | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
Potential Mitigations
- Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
- D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
- Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
References