CVE-2025-62526

OpenWrt Project is a Linux operating system targeting embedded devices. Prior to version 24.10.4, ubusd contains a heap buffer overflow in the event registration parsing code. This allows an attacker to modify the head and potentially execute arbitrary code in the context of the ubus daemon. The affected code is executed before running the ACL checks, all ubus clients are able to send such messages. In addition to the heap corruption, the crafted subscription also results in a bypass of the listen ACL. This is fixed in OpenWrt 24.10.4. There are no workarounds.

Weakness

A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/92.html

References

• https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/commit/4b907e69ea58fc0ba35fd1755dc4ba22262af3a4
• https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/commit/a7901969932a175cded3c93bdeb65f32ed3705e6
• https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-cp32-65v4-cp73
• https://github.com/openwrt/ubus/commit/60e04048a0e2f3e33651c19e62861b41be4c290f
• https://github.com/openwrt/ubus/commit/aa4a7ee1d3417bc11207ad0a78d579ece7fe0c13
• https://github.com/openwrt/ubus/commit/d31effb4277bd557f5ccf16d909422718c1e49d0
• https://openwrt.org/advisory/2025-10-22-1