OctoPrint provides a web interface for controlling consumer 3D printers. Versions 1.11.3 and below are affected by a vulnerability that allows injection of arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into Action Command notifications and prompts popups generated by the printer. An attacker who successfully convinces a victim to print a specially crafted file could exploit this issue to disrupt ongoing prints, extract information (including sensitive configuration settings, if the targeted user has the necessary permissions for that), or perform other actions on behalf of the targeted user within the OctoPrint instance. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.4.
Weakness
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special characters such as “<”, “>”, and “&” that could be interpreted as web-scripting elements when they are sent to a downstream component that processes web pages.
Potential Mitigations
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
References