There is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in NI LabVIEW in LVResFile::FindRsrcListEntry() when parsing a corrupted VI file. This vulnerability may result in information disclosure or arbitrary code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI LabVIEW 2025 Q3 (25.3) and prior versions.
Weakness
A stack-based buffer overflow condition is a condition where the buffer being overwritten is allocated on the stack (i.e., is a local variable or, rarely, a parameter to a function).
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Labview | Ni | 2022-q1 (including) | 2022-q1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2022-q3 (including) | 2022-q3 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2022-q3_patch1 (including) | 2022-q3_patch1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2022-q3_patch2 (including) | 2022-q3_patch2 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2022-q3_patch4 (including) | 2022-q3_patch4 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2022-q3_patch5 (including) | 2022-q3_patch5 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2022-q3_patch6 (including) | 2022-q3_patch6 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q1 (including) | 2023-q1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q3 (including) | 2023-q3 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q3_patch1 (including) | 2023-q3_patch1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q3_patch2 (including) | 2023-q3_patch2 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q3_patch3 (including) | 2023-q3_patch3 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q3_patch4 (including) | 2023-q3_patch4 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q3_patch5 (including) | 2023-q3_patch5 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q3_patch6 (including) | 2023-q3_patch6 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2023-q3_patch7 (including) | 2023-q3_patch7 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2024 (including) | 2024 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2024-q1 (including) | 2024-q1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2024-q1_patch1 (including) | 2024-q1_patch1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2024-q3 (including) | 2024-q3 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2024-q3_patch1 (including) | 2024-q3_patch1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2024-q3_patch2 (including) | 2024-q3_patch2 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2024-q3_patch3 (including) | 2024-q3_patch3 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2024-q3_patch4 (including) | 2024-q3_patch4 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2025-q1 (including) | 2025-q1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2025-q1_patch1 (including) | 2025-q1_patch1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2025-q1_patch2 (including) | 2025-q1_patch2 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2025-q1_patch3 (including) | 2025-q1_patch3 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2025-q3 (including) | 2025-q3 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2025-q3_patch1 (including) | 2025-q3_patch1 (including) |
| Labview | Ni | 2025-q3_patch2 (including) | 2025-q3_patch2 (including) |
Potential Mitigations
- Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
- D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
- Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].