Misskey is an open source, federated social media platform. Attackers who use an untrusted reverse proxy or not using a reverse proxy at all can bypass IP rate limiting by adding a forged X-Forwarded-For header. Starting with version 2025.9.1, an option (trustProxy) has been added in config file to prevent this from happening. However, it is initialized with an insecure default value before version 2025.12.0-alpha.2, making it still vulnerable if the configuration is not set correctly. This is patched in v2025.12.0-alpha.2 by flipping default value of trustProxy to false. Users of a trusted reverse proxy who are unsure if they manually overode this value should check their config for optimal behavior. Users are running Misskey with a trusted reverse proxy should not be affected by this vulnerability. From v2025.9.1 to v2025.11.1, workaround is available. Set trustProxy: false in config file.
The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame.
Common protection mechanisms include:
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator. [REF-45]