CVE-2025-71109

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

MIPS: ftrace: Fix memory corruption when kernel is located beyond 32 bits

Since commit e424054000878 (MIPS: Tracing: Reduce the overhead of dynamic Function Tracer), the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly has been used, and this macro can generate more than 2 instructions. At the same time, the code in ftrace assumes that no more than 2 instructions can be generated, which is why it stores them in an int[2] array. However, as previously noted, the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly (and now UASM_i_LA) causes a buffer overflow when _mcount is beyond 32 bits. This leads to corruption of the variables located in the __read_mostly section.

This corruption was observed because the variable __cpu_primary_thread_mask was corrupted, causing a hang very early during boot.

This fix prevents the corruption by avoiding the generation of instructions if they could exceed 2 instructions in length. Fortunately, insn_la_mcount is only used if the instrumented code is located outside the kernel code section, so dynamic ftrace can still be used, albeit in a more limited scope. This is still preferable to corrupting memory and/or crashing the kernel.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36dac9a3dda1f2bae343191bc16b910c603cac25
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f39b9d0e86ed6236b9a5fb67616ab1f76c4f150
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3e33ac2eb69d595079a1a1e444c2fb98efdd42d