Issue summary: A timing side-channel which could potentially allow remote recovery of the private key exists in the SM2 algorithm implementation on 64 bit ARM platforms.
Impact summary: A timing side-channel in SM2 signature computations on 64 bit ARM platforms could allow recovering the private key by an attacker..
While remote key recovery over a network was not attempted by the reporter, timing measurements revealed a timing signal which may allow such an attack.
OpenSSL does not directly support certificates with SM2 keys in TLS, and so this CVE is not relevant in most TLS contexts. However, given that it is possible to add support for such certificates via a custom provider, coupled with the fact that in such a custom provider context the private key may be recoverable via remote timing measurements, we consider this to be a Moderate severity issue.
The FIPS modules in 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as SM2 is not an approved algorithm.
Covert timing channels convey information by modulating some aspect of system behavior over time, so that the program receiving the information can observe system behavior and infer protected information.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nodejs | Ubuntu | esm-apps/jammy | * |
| Nodejs | Ubuntu | jammy | * |
| Openssl | Ubuntu | devel | * |
| Openssl | Ubuntu | plucky | * |
In some instances, knowing when data is transmitted between parties can provide a malicious user with privileged information. Also, externally monitoring the timing of operations can potentially reveal sensitive data. For example, a cryptographic operation can expose its internal state if the time it takes to perform the operation varies, based on the state. Covert channels are frequently classified as either storage or timing channels. Some examples of covert timing channels are the system’s paging rate, the time a certain transaction requires to execute, and the time it takes to gain access to a shared bus.