OpenClaw (npm package openclaw) versions >= 2026.7.2 and < 2026.9.2 contain a race condition in the Discord realtime voice transcript path. Concurrent control-classified voice transcripts could consume speaker context belonging to another participant after an asynchronous control check, causing a transcript to inherit another speakers owner status. In Discord agent-proxy voice sessions using the affected realtime control path, an utterance from a non-owner participant could reach the downstream agent boundary marked as owner, so owner-sensitive behavior is applied to the wrong speaker. Exploitation depends on concurrent transcript timing and on the tools and commands available to the affected agent. The issue is fixed in 2026.9.2; as a workaround, disable Discord realtime voice for agents that distinguish owner and non-owner senders.
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.