Capgo (capgo.app backend, versions ≤ 12.261.0) improperly restricts which roles the apikey_manager organization role may bind to newly created API keys. When an authenticated user holding only apikey_manager (permissions org.manage_apikeys and org.read) calls POST /apikey with a JWT session, the only checks applied are the org.manage_apikeys permission, a fixed deny-list of assignable role names (APIKEY_MANAGER_DENIED_ASSIGNABLE_ROLES in public/apikey/scope.ts), and a priority-rank comparison in createRoleBindingForPrincipal (private/role_bindings.ts). No check verifies that the caller actually holds the permissions conferred by the role being assigned. Because the deny-list omits the deploy roles app_developer, app_uploader, channel_developer and channel_uploader, and apikey_manager is seeded with priority_rank 78 — higher than those roles ranks (68, 66, 58, 57) — the rank check also passes. As a result, an apikey_manager who cannot upload bundles or promote channels can mint an API key bound to a deploy role and use it to push arbitrary OTA JavaScript updates to all end users of the organizations apps. As of the advisory publication no patched version was available.
Weakness
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
Potential Mitigations
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/122.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/233.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/58.html