ACM/MCE assisted-service writes raw referenced pull-secret contents into InfraEnv.status.conditions[].message when pull-secret validation fails. A namespace principal with the stock view ClusterRole cannot directly read Secrets, but can read InfraEnv objects and recover the referenced Secrets .dockerconfigjson data from status.
This bypasses the Kubernetes/OpenShift RBAC separation between read-only namespace viewers and Secret readers. In the reproduced proof, the same ServiceAccount was denied get and list on Secrets, but recovered synthetic pull-secret username, password, email, and base64 auth fields through InfraEnv.status.
Weakness
The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/12.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/217.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/612.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/613.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/618.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/619.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/621.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/622.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/623.html