Heym before 0.0.53 fails to verify Slack request signatures when trigger nodes lack credential IDs or have empty signing secrets. Remote unauthenticated attackers can send forged Slack events to known webhook URLs to trigger workflows with the owners credentials.
Weakness
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.
Potential Mitigations
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/114.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/115.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/151.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/194.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/57.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
References
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/341d1012367cd74f85c617e1c98dd49e3fcb5e83
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-pm6h-x3h5-j38h
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.53-slack-webhook-signature-verification-bypass
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-pm6h-x3h5-j38h