In Eclipse Vert.x versions [4.0.0, 4.5.34] or [5.0.0,5.0.12] or [5.1.0,5.1.9] or [5.2.0, 5.2.0], the Eclipse Vert.x MQTT (vertx-mqtt) MqttClient stores every inbound QoS 2 PUBLISH message received from the broker in an internal map (qos2inbound) while awaiting the corresponding PUBREL packet to complete the QoS 2 handshake. This map has no size limit; the maxInflightQueue option is enforced only on the outbound publish path and does not constrain inbound message retention.
A malicious or compromised MQTT broker can exploit this by sending QoS 2 PUBLISH messages with distinct packet identifiers and withholding the PUBREL responses. Each incomplete handshake causes the client to retain the full publish message (topic, payload, and metadata) indefinitely, leading to unbounded memory growth in the Vert.x process. This can degrade the MQTT-consuming application or cause out-of-memory termination.
The impacted component is io.vertx:vertx-mqtt.
Weakness
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vert.x | Eclipse | 4.5.0 (including) | 4.5.35 (excluding) |
| Vert.x | Eclipse | 5.0.0 (including) | 5.1.10 (excluding) |
| Vert.x | Eclipse | 5.2.0 (including) | 5.2.0 (including) |
Potential Mitigations
Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
Related Attack Patterns
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- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/491.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/493.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/494.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/495.html
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- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html