Improper verification of the source of a communication channel in the DNS resolver in Amazon FreeRTOS-Plus-TCP before V4.4.2 might allow remote third-party to insert a chosen address into the devices DNS cache via a forged DNS reply.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version V4.4.2 and enable ipconfigDNS_CHECK_REPLY_SOURCE_IP.
Weakness
The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.
Potential Mitigations
- Use a mechanism that can validate the identity of the source, such as a certificate, and validate the integrity of data to ensure that it cannot be modified in transit using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack.
- When designing functionality of actions in the URL scheme, consider whether the action should be accessible to all mobile applications, or if an allowlist of applications to interface with is appropriate.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/500.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/594.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/595.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/596.html