Burrito is a Terraform Automation Collaboration Software (TACoS) Kubernetes operator. Prior to 0.13.0, POST /api/webhook accepts unsigned GitHub and GitLab events when a TerraformRepositorys credentials omit webhookSecret or set it to an empty value, including credentials configured for git authentication and polling. Credential.WebhookSecret is optional, and go-playground/webhooks skips signature or token verification when the secret is empty. Anyone who can reach burrito-servers endpoint and knows a tracked repositorys URL can forge events to create or delete TerraformPullRequest custom resources with attacker-chosen Branch, Base, and ID fields. For GitHub pull_request events, the controller fetches changed files using the real pull request number but does not cross-check the payloads branch against that pull request. Pairing a real, existing pull request number with an unrelated existing branch in the same repository can therefore cause an unauthorized terraform plan for affected layers using the operators stored git and cloud credentials. Code analysis also indicates that the resulting plan can be posted to the real pull requests comment thread, exposing and misattributing another branchs infrastructure changes. Auto-apply is disabled for these temporary layers, so this vulnerability alone cannot force a terraform apply; plan-time provider and data-source code execution depends on the selected branchs contents. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.0.
Weakness
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
Potential Mitigations
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, “grow-your-own” authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/12.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/166.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/216.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/36.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/62.html