JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From 4.5.7 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, the markdownviewer:trust and notebook:trust command-link handlers use tracker.currentWidget to resolve the current Markdown viewer or notebook when the user answers rather than retaining the document whose command button was clicked. If another document becomes current while the prompt is open and the user chooses Trust, JupyterLab marks the second document trusted while leaving the clicked document untrusted. Later command buttons in the incorrectly trusted document run without a prompt, and trusting a notebook marks all cells trusted, saves unsaved edits, and persists the server signature to disk. Applications that bundle JupyterLab, including affected Notebook and JupyterLite releases, inherit the behavior. This issue is fixed in versions 4.5.11 and 4.6.4.
Weakness
The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource’s state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.
Potential Mitigations
Related Attack Patterns
References
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/0fc18ab4ef67e431a8f6560e387193baf786c70a
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/b64bc88b8ca034cf158604a5cc48ca9170ea453b
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/f7e5f9803fdf2aaaa0e9bfb9cc73386a8cc5f0b2
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.11
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.6.4
- https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-jwrc-gm9j-263p