Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (CWE-639) in Elasticsearch can lead to Information Disclosure via a specially crafted cross-cluster search request that references an unauthorized shard identifier. Elasticsearch contains an authorization bypass weakness in its handling of cross-cluster search requests made through the Remote Cluster Security (RCS) 2.0 model. An authorization check validates a request against one identifying attribute of the target shard, while a separate, independently-supplied identifying attribute in the same request determines which shard is actually accessed. A holder of a cross-cluster API key authorized for one index can craft a request whose two identifying attributes refer to different indices, causing the request to be authorized against an index they can access while actually operating against a different, unauthorized index. This can expose that indexs document contents, field mappings, and other metadata, and in limited cases allows modification of retention-lease state on the unauthorized index.
The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.