Server-side request forgery in the OAuth2 discovery handling in Loom for AWS before 1.7.0 might allow an authenticated remote user to obtain the access token of another user of the deployment and to cause the application to issue requests to arbitrary internal network locations, via a crafted discovery document address supplied when registering a tool server or remote agent configured for delegated authentication.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 1.7.0 or later.
Weakness
The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/12.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/217.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/612.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/613.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/618.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/619.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/621.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/622.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/623.html