The Gitea OpenID association callback in the security settings accepted a positive OpenID 2.0 assertion without checking that the signed-in user had started the linking. Because OpenID 2.0 allows unsolicited assertions, an attacker-controlled OpenID provider could attach the attackers identity to the account of a signed-in victim who opened a crafted link, and the attacker could then sign in as the victim through OpenID login, which does not apply the local TOTP or WebAuthn checks. The callback now requires a time-limited state value bound to the user.
Weakness
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.
Potential Mitigations
Related Attack Patterns
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