Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 14.6.0 until 22.7.9 and 23.1.2, Nx creates Unix domain sockets for its daemon and isolated plugin workers in shared temporary locations without owner-only directory and socket permissions. Another unprivileged local account on a shared build server, developer host, or multi-user container can discover and connect to a running socket because the transport performs no authentication and relies on filesystem containment. The daemons PROCESS_IN_BACKGROUND request accepts a module path and invokes its default export, allowing a caller that controls a file to execute code as the account running Nx; other handlers can expose workspace file contents, project graphs, and task hashes. Disabling the daemon alone does not remove the vulnerable plugin-worker sockets, while single-user machines without another local account are not exposed. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.9 and 23.1.2.
Weakness
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
Potential Mitigations
Related Attack Patterns
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/122.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/233.html
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/58.html
References
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/3298fd8b2dd066167eb3cc0410643994a59b0bba
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/63e1abb287a3d69f8ba981828a1de325d0d3dc68
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/71c2253b6aac23b008e192c4e2642c42a5e07545
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/36370
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/22.7.9
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/23.1.2
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-w3vv-58gj-gw77